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Introduction
States differ about whether to recognize wrongful pregnancy,
wrongful birth, and wrongful life, some recognizing none of these
prenatal torts, others recognizing only one or two, while still others
recognizing all three. Even if two states recognize one of these torts,
those states may differ about the kinds of damages recoverable by a
plaintiff bringing that cause of action.1 These differences
notwithstanding, the states as a general matter agree about how to
distinguish the prenatal torts from other kinds of torts involving
prebirth medical negligence.2 Regrettably, some courts have lost sight
of what distinguishes these prenatal torts from other torts involving
medical negligence, which may have important implications both for
these prenatal torts in particular and for tort law more generally.
†

Trustees Professor of Law at Capital University Law School in Columbus,
Ohio. His research focus is on constitutional and family law issues, broadly
construed.

1.

See infra notes 30–33 (noting differences among states with respect to
compensable damages for wrongful pregnancy).

2.

See infra notes 11–17 and accompanying text (distinguishing between the
more general tort where a physician is sued because of negligence resulting
in a harmful condition or resulting in the loss of an opportunity to correct
a particular impairment and a prenatal tort where the negligence results
in the loss of an opportunity to abort or to avoid conception in the first
place).
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Part I discusses the prenatal tort jurisprudence, discussing some of
the differences among the states with respect to whether the causes of
action will be recognized and which kinds of damages are recoverable.
Part II discusses other kinds of prebirth medical negligence and why it
is important not to conflate these different kinds of cases. The article
concludes that conflation of these different kinds of torts will have
regrettable consequences both for individual families and for tort
jurisprudence more generally, and that courts must not only be careful
not to confuse these different kinds of claims but must also correct some
of the mistakes that have already been made.

I.

The Prenatal Torts

Jurisdictions vary both with respect to how particular prenatal
torts are defined and to which prenatal torts will be recognized.
Nonetheless, certain elements of these torts are almost universally
recognized and, further, have played an important role in determining
which damages, if any, will be recoverable. Understanding these
commonalities and the roles they play will not only help clarify the
jurisprudence but will also help prevent limitations on damages in ways
that would adversely impact even more families in an ever-increasing
number of contexts.
A.

Wrongful Birth

Many states recognize wrongful birth claims.3 As the Iowa Supreme
Court explained, “In a wrongful-birth action, parents of a child born
with a detectable birth defect allege that they would have avoided
conception or terminated the pregnancy but for the physician’s
negligent failure to inform them of the likelihood of the birth defect.”4
The medical professional did not cause the undesirable condition.5
3.

Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Iowa 2017)
(“A majority of states recognize wrongful-birth claims.”).

4.

Id. (citing Keel v. Banach, 624 So.2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1993)).

5.

Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 67 (S.C. 2004) (“Wrongful . . . birth actions
differ from a typical medical malpractice action because the negligent act
or omission of the health care provider did not actually cause the
impairment or defective condition.”); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
512 N.E.2d 691, 698 (Ill. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Clark v.
Children’s Mem’l Hosp., 955 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. 2011). The court noted:
[T]he Siemieniecs do not assert that the defendants either caused
Adam’s inherited genetic disorder or increased the risk that
Adam, if born, would be afflicted with hemophilia. Rather, they
allege that they were tortiously injured because Mrs. Siemieniec
was deprived of the option of making an informed and meaningful
decision either to abort the already existing and defective
fetus . . . or to give birth to a potentially genetically defective
child.
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Rather, in this kind of case, there has been a “failure to diagnose or
failure to advise the parents . . . so that the parents can make an
informed decision about the risks of pregnancy and childbirth.”6
The Iowa Supreme Court explained the elements of a traditional
case involving medical negligence to show why wrongful birth claims fit
within that class of claims. “The traditional elements of a medical
negligence action are (1) an applicable standard of care, (2) a violation
of this standard, and (3) a causal relationship between the violation
and injury sustained.”7 In wrongful birth cases, a medical professional
allegedly acted negligently (i.e., failed to meet the applicable standard
of care) and that negligence (which somehow involved a failure to
accurately communicate important information in a timely way)
resulted in the birth of a child who would not have been born but for
that negligent failure to communicate.8
The Iowa court noted that in the more traditional torts there is no
requirement that the alleged tortfeasor caused the disease or
impairment in order for that individual to be liable. The court had
“previously allowed patients to sue for a physician’s negligent failure
to diagnose health problems the physician did not cause.”9
A negligent professional need not have caused a disease in order to
be liable, at least in part, because the failure to diagnose in a timely
way might cause a patient to lose the opportunity to be cured or to
have the condition mitigated.10 In the more standard medical negligence
Id. Provencio v. Wenrich, 261 P.3d 1089, 1093 (N.M. 2011) (“[W]rongful
birth . . . claims are unlike other, more traditional claims for pre-natal
medical malpractice. In the more typical prenatal medical negligence case,
it is the child or the child’s representative who asserts a claim for damages
against a health-care provider, generally a doctor, for the child’s own
injuries.”). Cf. Patricia Howlett, Compensation for Drug Induced Fetal
Deformities in Common and Civil Law Systems, 2 TOURO J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 243, 246 (1991) (“[O]ver a period of several years, certain specific
deformities began to appear in children whose mothers took Bendectin:
most notably deformities of the hands and feet, especially club foot.”).
6.

Provencio, 261 P.3d at 1094.

7.

Plowman, 896 N.W.2d at 401 (citing Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 625
N.W.2d 714, 718 (Iowa 2001)).

8.

See id. at 399 (“In a wrongful-birth action, parents of a child born with a
detectable birth defect allege that they would have avoided conception or
terminated the pregnancy but for the physician’s negligent failure to
inform them of the likelihood of the birth defect.”) (citing Keel v. Banach,
624 So.2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1993)).

9.

Id. at 402.

10.

Cf. Sullins v. Univ. Hosp. of Cleveland, 2003-Ohio-398, at § 10 (Ohio Ct.
App.) (“He alleged that the combination of the nursing care and the
consult delayed detection of and, therefore, the treatment for,
tuberculosis until it was too late to be effective.”); Greco v. United States,
893 P.2d 345, 349 (Nev. 1995) (“Even though the physician did not cause
the cancer, the physician can be held liable for damages resulting from
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claim, the person with the affliction is suing because that person would
have been better off if only the negligence had not occurred.
This more standard kind of medical negligence claim can arise in
the context of a pregnancy. For example, a fetus negligently exposed to
X-rays or dangerous substances might thereby be harmed.11 Or, a failure
to diagnose a fetal condition might result in the fetus not undergoing
treatment in utero that would have prevented or corrected some of the
negative effects associated with a particular condition or disease.12 In
the more standard case of medical negligence, the imagined comparator
is what life would have been like for the child without the impairment
attributable to the negligence.13 In wrongful birth cases, the imagined
comparator (as far as the child is concerned) is in not having been born14
rather than in having lived without a particular affliction.15
the patient’s decreased opportunity to fight the cancer, and for the more
extensive pain, suffering and medical treatment the patient must undergo
by reason of the negligent diagnosis.”).
11.

See Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in
Women’s Health Care: A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study
Sex Discrimination in the Statutes, 16 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 153, 192
(1995) (discussing “potential harm to the pregnancy from exposure to
chemical substances or radiation”).

12.

See Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence,
55 ALA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2003). Pollard explained:
It is now sometimes the case that early detection of genetic defects
provides an opportunity for the mother and/or fetus to undergo
medical treatment to prevent the defect’s manifestation at birth.
In these cases, the claim is not that life itself was wrongful but
rather that but for the doctor’s negligent failure to detect the
defect, medical intervention could have minimized or could have
prevented the defect from manifesting at birth.
Id.

13.

Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 698 (Ill.
1987), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp.,
955 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. 2011) (“In an ordinary prenatal-injury case, if the
defendant had not been negligent, then the child would have been born
healthy.” (citing Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill.
1977))).

14.

For a discussion of the claim that it would have been better for a
particular child never to have lived at all than to have lived with a
particular condition, see infra notes 52–65 and accompanying text
(discussing wrongful life claims).

15.

Provencio v. Wenrich, 261 P.3d 1089, 1093–94 (N.M. 2011) (“At the other
end of the negligence spectrum is wrongful birth . . . . In jurisdictions
recognizing these claims, wrongful birth is generally brought ‘by the
parents of a child born with birth defects alleging that due to negligent
medical advice or testing they were precluded from making an informed
decision about whether to conceive a potentially handicapped child, or, in
the event of pregnancy, to terminate it.’”).
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In many wrongful birth cases, the parents lost the chance to abort,16
and the focus of the wrongful birth action is the harm done to the
parent for having been deprived of the opportunity to avoid having the
child with the serious affliction.17 To be successful in a wrongful birth
action, the parent must assert that if informed of the relevant
information in a timely way, the parent either would have aborted the
pregnancy or, perhaps, would not have conceived in the first place.18
Unless willing to make one of those assertions, the parent will be unable
to establish that the negligent failure to provide accurate information
in a timely way was causally responsible for the birth of the child.19
Even if causation can be established, the parent in addition must
establish harm.20 Regrettably, some courts have been confused about
the proper comparator in the wrongful birth context. For example, the
Florida Supreme Court reasoned that “[i]n the context of wrongful
birth, this means the situation that would have existed had the child
actually been born in the state of health parents were led to believe
would occur. Damages are not gauged against the state of affairs that
would have existed had the child never been born, because parents
always assume the costs of healthy children born to them, even if
unplanned.”21 But if the negligence was in failing to provide in a timely
way the information that would have led to the parent’s not having the
child,22 then the harm attributable to the medical professional is in
16.

Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004) (“The parent alleges that the
negligence of those charged with prenatal testing or genetic counseling
deprived them of the right to make a timely decision regarding whether
to terminate a pregnancy because of the likelihood their child would be
born physically or mentally impaired.”).

17.

Provencio, 261 P.3d at 1094 (“Wrongful birth is appropriately
characterized as a claim-based failure to diagnose or failure to advise the
parents. The duty owed is part of the doctor’s obligation to provide
adequate care so that the parents can make an informed decision about
the risks of pregnancy and childbirth; adequate care includes adequate
notice.”).

18.

See Sofia Yakren, ”Wrongful Birth” Claims and the Paradox of Parenting
a Child with a Disability, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 583, 590 (2018) (discussing
“the need for a mother to testify that she would have aborted her child”).

19.

Cf. Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 745–46 (Mo. 1988) (“In the
wrongful birth action, the right to recovery is based solely on the woman
testifying, long after the fact and when it is in her financial interest to do
so, that she would have chosen to abort if the physician had but told her
of the amniocentesis test.”).

20.

Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla. 1992) (“[T]he central policy of
all tort law is to place a person in a position nearly equivalent to what
would have existed had the defendants’ conduct not breached a duty owed
to plaintiffs, thereby causing injury.”).

21.

Id.

22.

Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993). The court reasoned:
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having deprived the parents of the opportunity not to live with the
child with the disability at issue. There was never a possibility that the
parents would have a child who was born without the affliction, so it is
difficult to see why the damages should be construed as if that had been
a possibility.23
Jurisdictions recognizing wrongful birth actions tend to permit the
parents to recover the extraordinary costs of raising their child.24 As a
general matter, those asserting a wrongful birth claim had been hoping
to have a child, albeit without a debilitating condition. In contrast, a
parent suing because of a negligently performed sterilization had been
hoping not to have more or any children at all.25 The parent bringing
the latter suit is bringing a wrongful pregnancy claim.

The nature of the tort of wrongful birth has nothing to do with
whether a defendant caused the in-jury or harm to the child, but,
rather, with whether the defendant’s negligence was the proximate
cause of the parents’ being deprived of the option of avoiding a
conception or, in the case of pregnancy, making an informed and
meaningful decision either to terminate the pregnancy or to give
birth to a potentially defective child.
Id.
23.

Cf. Jillian T. Stein, Backdoor Eugenics: The Troubling Implications of
Certain Damages Awards in Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims,
40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1117, 1130 (2010). Stein explained:
In
wrongful
birth
and
wrongful
life
suits,
the
doctor’s negligence led to the birth of a disabled child—a child
that allegedly would not have been born at all if the doctor had
properly warned the parents. This is quite distinguishable from
the prenatal-injury tort where the doctor’s negligence causes
the fetus to suffer some harm in utero—but for the doctor’s
negligence, the child would have been born ‘with a sound mind
and body.’
Id.

24.

See, e.g., Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 292 (Del. 1989)
(“We hold that the parents may be able to recover damages to the extent
the extraordinary expenses of caring for, maintaining and educating the
child exceed the usual costs of raising an unimpaired child.”); Lininger v.
Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Colo. 1899). The court held:
[T]he Liningers’ complaint sufficiently states a cause of action
upon which relief may be granted, and they are entitled to prove
and to recover at least the extraordinary medical and education
expenses they have incurred, and will incur, in raising Pierce, if
they are able to establish that those expenses were proximately
caused by defendants’ negligence.
Id.

25.

See Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 213 (Ga. 1999) (making this
distinction).
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B.

Wrongful Pregnancy

A wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception claim is predicated
on a medical professional’s having been negligent when providing
sterilization or abortion services or, perhaps, on a manufacturer’s
having provided a faulty contraceptive prescription or device.26
Typically, in these kinds of cases, the child is born healthy27 but the
parents claim to have been harmed, e.g., because they cannot afford to
raise another child.28
Jurisdictions recognizing this cause of action29 differ about the kinds
of damages that are recoverable.30 The Indiana Supreme Court
26.

Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004) (internal citation omitted).
A ”wrongful pregnancy” or ”wrongful contraception” action is brought by
the parent of a healthy but unplanned child, seeking damages from a
health care provider who allegedly was negligent in performing a
sterilization procedure or abortion, or from a pharmacist or
pharmaceutical manufacturer who allegedly was negligent in dispensing
or manufacturing a contraceptive prescription or device.

27.

See Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115 (Md. 2002) (suggesting that
such an action is “brought by ‘parents of a normal but unplanned child
[seeking] damages either from a physician who allegedly was negligent in
performing a sterilization procedure or abortion, or from a pharmacist or
pharmaceutical manufacturer who allegedly was negligent in dispensing
or manufacturing a contraceptive prescription or device.’”) (citing Walker
by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 737 (Ariz. 1990)).

28.

See Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 612 (N.M. 1991) (“[T]he
Mendezes’ interest in the financial security of their family was a legally
protected interest which was invaded by Lovelace’s negligent failure
properly to perform Maria’s sterilization operation (if proved at trial).”)

29.

See Kimberly D. Wilcoxon, Statutory Remedies for Judicial Torts: The
Need for Wrongful Birth Legislation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (2001)
(“Thirty-five states recognize wrongful conception.”).

30.

See, e.g., Arche v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 478 (Kan. 1990)
(“The majority of states addressing the question, including Kansas, have
recognized
a
cause
of
action
for
limited
damages
for wrongful pregnancy.”); M.A. v. United States, 951 P.2d 851, 852
(Alaska 1998). The court noted [referring to Keel]:
We conclude that negligent failure to diagnose a pregnancy gives
rise to a cause of action for medical malpractice and is
compensable to the extent that damages are ordinarily allowable
in medical malpractice cases, but that no recovery may be
awarded for expenses of rearing a healthy child born as a result of
the misdiagnosis.
Id. Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 412 (R.I. 1997). The court
explained:
Under the limited-recovery rule the foregoing jurisdictions
frequently grant compensation to the plaintiffs for the medical
expenses of the ineffective sterilization procedure, for the medical
and hospital costs of the pregnancy, for the expense of a
subsequent sterilization procedure, for loss of wages, and
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explained that “parents of healthy children born after an unsuccessful
sterilization procedure involving medical negligence are entitled to
pregnancy and childbearing expenses, but not child-rearing expenses.”31
The court suggested that this limitation on damages was justified
because “the value of a child’s life to the parents outweighs the
associated pecuniary burdens as a matter of law.”32 A few jurisdictions
are unwilling to impose this limitation on damages, instead permitting
parents to recover childrearing expenses in addition to pregnancy and
childbearing expenses.33
Often, courts list several factors when characterizing what
distinguishes wrongful birth cases from wrongful pregnancy/conception
cases. But such an approach makes classification difficult if a case
involves one or more factors normally associated with one tort and one
or more factors normally associated with a different tort. For example,
a child born after a negligently performed sterilization may have a
severe impairment, and courts must decide whether such a case should
be analyzed in light of the wrongful pregnancy jurisprudence (because
the parents had not wanted to have any more children at all) or the
wrongful birth jurisprudence (because the parents now have a child
with a possibly serious affliction who would not have been born but for
the medical professional’s negligence).
In Williams v. University of Chicago Hospitals, Alice Williams
sought damages after never having been told that her tubal ligation had
been unsuccessful.34 She later became pregnant and gave birth to a
child.35 Because her son had “attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
and [would] require psychological treatment and special educational

sometimes for emotional distress arising out of the unwanted
pregnancy and loss of consortium to the spouse arising out of the
unwanted pregnancy. They also generally include medical
expenses for prenatal care, delivery, and postnatal care.
Id. Tatiana Elizabeth Posada, Note, Whose Sperm Is It Anyways in the
Wild, Wild West of the Fertility Industry?, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 847, 854
(2018) (“Where wrongful conception is recognized, damages usually
include the mother’s medical expenses and ‘emotional distress damages
associated with pregnancy and childbirth,’ but most courts have declined
to expand ‘such damages to the costs of raising the unexpected child to
adulthood.’”).
31.

Chaffee v. Seslar, 786 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ind. 2003).

32.

Id.

33.

See Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Wis. 1990); See also
Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990); Mendez, 805 P.2d at 603.

34.

Williams v. Univ. of Chi. Hosp., 688 N.E.2d 130, 131 (Ill. 1997).

35.

Id. at 132 (“Mrs. Williams learned in May 1991 that she was pregnant,
however, and she gave birth in October 1991 to the child who is the
subject of the instant appeal, Emmanuel.”).
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training in the years ahead,”36 she sought “recovery of those
extraordinary expenses.”37 The Illinois Supreme Court refused to allow
recovery of those damages, reasoning that the parents could not
“establish that the defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of their
injury, for under the allegations in this case the . . . injury cannot be
said to be of such a character that an ordinarily prudent person should
have foreseen it as a likely consequence of the alleged negligence.”38
Allegedly, there was no allegation of “any act or omission by the
defendants [that] caused the child’s condition”39 nor “that the
defendants knew of the possibility that a child conceived in the wake
of a failed operation would suffer from a particular defect”40 nor “even
that the parents were seeking to avoid a specific risk and that the
defendants were aware of that.”41 Yet, there is reason to doubt the
court’s analysis of the facts—the patient’s medical history included that
she had already had a child with certain difficulties,42 so the medical
professionals would have been on notice that an additional child might
have similar difficulties, assuming that those difficulties were due to a
genetic condition.43 In any event, the court rejected that the child’s
condition was sufficiently foreseeable to justify the imposition of
liability for extraordinary childrearing damages.44
Courts focusing on whether the medical professional was on notice
about the foreseeability of a particular condition might consider what
the parents revealed about their motivations for seeking a sterilization.45
36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

Id. at 134.

39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42.

Id. at 131 (citation omitted) (“[H]er medical history included a possible
ectopic pregnancy in 1979, a stillborn child in 1982, a premature birth in
1984, and ’at least one hyperactive and learning disabled child.’”).

43.

See id. (“The plaintiffs allege that the child has attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, a congenital condition.”).

44.

Id. at 134 (“[W]e do not believe that proximate cause can be established
in the absence of allegations forging a closer link between the defendant’s
negligence and the eventual birth of the defective child.”).

45.

Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 414 (R.I. 1997). The court
explained:
[W]hen a physician is placed on notice, in performing a
sterilization procedure, that the parents have a reasonable
expectation of giving birth to a physically or a mentally
handicapped child or if the physician should be placed on notice,
by reason of statistical information of which he/she is or should
be aware in the practice of his/her profession, then the entire cost
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For example, when analyzing which damages were recoverable in a case
involving a negligently performed sterilization, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts reasoned that the recovery of childrearing
expenses (minus the value of the benefits received by the parents’
having had the child46) was permitted where the parents sought the
sterilization for financial reasons.47 However, parents who sought the
sterilization for eugenic reasons would not be entitled to childrearing
expenses,48 even though such parents might have worried about both
the financial and the psychological costs associated with their child
having a feared condition.49
Both wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy actions are brought
by the parent on her own behalf.50 In both kinds of cases, it is alleged
that but for a medical professional’s negligence, the parent’s child would
not have lived either because the child would never have been conceived
or because the pregnancy would have been aborted.51 Similarly, in a

of raising such a child would be within the ambit of recoverable
damages.
Id.
46.

Burke v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Mass. 1990) (“In such a situation, the
trier of fact should offset against the cost of rearing the child the benefit,
if any, the parents receive and will receive from having their child.”).

47.

Id. (“[P]arents may recover the cost of rearing a normal, healthy but (at
least initially) unwanted child if their reason for seeking sterilization was
founded on economic or financial considerations.”).

48.

Id. at 5 (“If the parents’ desire to avoid the birth of a child was founded
on eugenic reasons (avoidance of a feared genetic defect) . . . , the
justification for allowing recovery of the costs of rearing a normal child to
maturity is far less.”).

49.

James N. Zartman, Discretionary Trusts for Disabled Beneficiaries,
81 ILL. B.J. 516, 517 (1993) (“The costs, both psychological and financial,
for the family of a child who suffers serious mental illness or developmental
disability are enormous.”).

50.

Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004) (“A ’wrongful birth’ action is
brought by the parent of a child born with an impairment or birth
defect.”); id. (“A ’wrongful pregnancy’ or ’wrongful contraception’ action
is brought by the parent of a healthy but unplanned child[.]”).

51.

Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1993). The court offered the
following clarification:
[A] “wrongful birth action” refers to a claim for relief by parents
who allege they would have avoided conception or would have
terminated the pregnancy but for the negligence of those charged
with prenatal testing, genetic prognosticating, or counseling
parents as to the likelihood of giving birth to a physically or
mentally impaired child.
Id. Williams v. Univ. of Chi. Hosp., 688 N.E.2d 130, 132 (Ill. 1997)
(internal citations omitted). The court explained:
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wrongful life action, the plaintiff argues that but for the medical
professional’s negligence, the child would never have been born.52
However, the wrongful life case is dissimilar from the wrongful birth or
wrongful pregnancy claim in that a wrongful life action is brought by
or on behalf of the child herself.53
C.

Wrongful Life

A child bringing a wrongful life claim argues that she or he would
have been better off never having lived than having lived with her or
his debilitating conditions. While the devastating conditions were not
caused by the medical professional, the professional’s failure to inform
the child’s parents in a timely way resulted in the child being born and
forced to endure great hardship.54 Very few states recognize wrongful
life actions.55
Many states refuse to recognize wrongful life actions regardless of
the child’s condition. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court
An action for ”wrongful pregnancy” or, as it has also been
termed, ”wrongful conception”—the action involved here—may
be brought by parents following a negligently performed
sterilization procedure. In an action for wrongful pregnancy, the
parents seek to recover compensation for the expenses of the
pregnancy they sought to avoid.
Id.
52.

Willis, 607 S.E.2d at 66. The child alleges, because of the defendant’s
negligence, his parents either decided to conceive him ignorant of the risk
of an impairment or birth defect, or were deprived of information during
gestation that would have prompted them to terminate the pregnancy.
The child alleges, but for the defendant’s negligence, he would not have
been born.

53.

Id. (“A ’wrongful life’ action is brought by or on behalf of the child
himself.”).

54.

Id. The court explained:
The child alleges, because of the defendant’s negligence, his
parents either decided to conceive him ignorant of the risk of an
impairment or birth defect, or were deprived of information
during gestation that would have prompted them to terminate the
pregnancy. The child alleges, but for the defendant’s negligence,
he would not have been born. The birth defect or impairment
itself occurred naturally, i.e., it was not directly caused by an act
or omission of the defendant health care provider.
Id.

55.

Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful
Life Actions, 40 Harv. C.R.- C.L. L. Rev. 141, 162 (2005)
(“United States courts and legislatures have almost universally refused
to recognize wrongful life actions.”);Michael B. Laudor, In Defense of
Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory to the Defense of a Tort, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 1675, 1688 (1994) (“Only California, New Jersey, and
Washington recognize wrongful life as a cause of action.”).
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suggested that an individual’s “life, however impaired and regardless of
any attendant expenses, cannot rationally be said to be a detriment to
him when measured against the alternative of his not having existed at
all.”56 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals offered a different
reason—”it is an impossible task to calculate damages based on a
comparison between life in an impaired state and no life at all.”57 The
Missouri Supreme Court offered yet another reason:
The heart of the problem in these cases is that the physician
cannot be said to have caused the defect. The disorder is genetic
and not the result of any injury negligently inflicted by the doctor.
In addition it is incurable and was incurable from the moment of
conception. Thus the doctor’s alleged negligent failure to detect
it during prenatal examination cannot be considered a cause of
the condition by analogy to those cases in which the doctor has
failed to make a timely diagnosis of a curable disease. The child’s
handicap is an inexorable result of conception and birth.58

Whether the reason for barring the cause of action is because the
preferability of non-life to a life with severe disabilities “is a mystery
more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians”59 or
because “the physician did not actually cause the congenital
impairment or defect,”60 many jurisdictions treat such claims as
noncognizable. Parents in such jurisdictions will be barred from
56.

Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1899).

57.

Kassama v. Magat, 767 A.2d 348, 369 (Md. Spec. App. 2001), aff’d, 792
A.2d 1102 (Md. 2002). See also Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1166
(Ohio 2000) (“Judges and jurors are no more able to judge the value of a
life with disabilities versus nonbeing than they are able to judge the value
of life in a ‘normal’ condition (however that might be defined) versus
nonbeing.”); see also Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 293
(Del. 1989) (“We adopt the view of many jurisdictions that have denied
wrongful life claims due to the impossible task of identifying damages
based on a comparison between life in the child’s impaired state and
nonexistence.”); Willis, 607 S.E.2d at 69. The court summarized:
Most courts refusing to recognize a wrongful life action have done
so primarily for two reasons. First, these courts reason being born
is not a legally cognizable injury, regardless of the severity of the
defective condition afflicting the infant or child. Such courts
believe it is asking too much to expect any court or jury to weigh
the fact of being born with a defective condition against the fact
of not being born at all, i.e., non-existence. Therefore, it is legally
and logically impossible to calculate damages allegedly suffered by
the child.
Id.

58.

Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 744–45 (Mo. 1988).

59.

Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).

60.

Willis, 607 S.E.2d at 70.
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receiving proceeds from a wrongful life action to help pay for the
services their desperately handicapped child needs.
Consider a state that recognizes wrongful life actions. A plaintiff
bringing such an action in that jurisdiction must establish that his or
her particular condition is sufficiently burdensome to fall within the
limited class of conditions providing the basis for such a claim. Many
individuals might wish that they were taller61 or shorter62 or more
beautiful (however defined),63 but dissatisfaction with one’s appearance
or athletic prowess will not suffice to establish that it would have been
better never to have lived at all.64 Rather, the plaintiff will have to
establish that his or her existence was so unbearable that it would have
been better never to have existed.65
Even if the courts have not barred wrongful life claims as a matter
of public policy,66 there might still be other stumbling blocks to the
recognition of such a cause of action. A state might as a matter of
public policy view with a jaundiced eye67 any birth-related causes of
61.

M. Dittman, Standing Tall Pays Off, Study Finds, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N
(July-Aug.
2004), https://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug04/standing
[https://perma.cc/QPM9-29Y4] (“When it comes to height, every inch
counts—in fact, in the workplace, each inch above average may be worth
$789 more per year, according to a study in the Journal of Applied
Psychology (Vol. 89, No. 3).”).

62.

Nicola Davis, Tall People at Greater Risk of Cancer ‘Because They Have
More
Cells,’ THE
GUARDIAN,
(Oct.
23,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2018/oct/24/tall-people-atgreater-risk-of-cancer-because-they-have-more-cells
[https://perma.cc/57Q3-NTNE] (“Taller people have a greater risk of
cancer because they are bigger and so have more cells in their bodies in
which dangerous mutations can occur, new research has suggested.”).

63.

See Joss Fong, The Economic Benefits of Being Beautiful, VOX (July 16,
2014, 1:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/7/16/5905533/the-benefitsof-beauty [https://perma.cc/8UH3-N9HC] (“Researchers from the fields
of psychology, sociology and economics have repeatedly found that
attractive people benefit from widespread biases that can translate into
big bucks over the course of a lifetime.”).

64.

See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982) (“In this case, in
which the plaintiff’s only affliction is deafness, it seems quite unlikely that
a jury would ever conclude that life with such a condition is worse than
not being born at all.”).

65.

See I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187, 1208
(2012) (“A life not worth living is a life so full of pain and suffering, and
so devoid of anything good, that the individual would prefer never to have
come into existence.”).

66.

Hensel, supra note 55, at 143–44.

67.

Cf. Dennis A. Rendleman, Pogo Professionalism: A Call for A
Commission on Truth and Professionalism, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 181, 194
(2012) (“Many states continue to view lawyer advertising with a
very jaundiced eye.”); see e.g. William H. Lewis Jr. & Hunter L.
Prillaman, Reasonably Available Control Technology under the Clean Air
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action that provide damages in cases in which an individual has been
precluded from exercising her abortion rights.
D.

Abortion

Abortion remains a constitutional right protected under the right
to privacy.68 Nonetheless, states have very different approaches to the
role that the right to abortion should play in prenatal tort
jurisprudence.
Consider the plaintiff’s duty of mitigation.69 It might seem that a
plaintiff seeking damages for a prenatal tort would have a duty to
mitigate damages by seeking an abortion or, perhaps, putting her child
up for adoption.70 However, courts as a general matter have rejected
that the duty to mitigate includes the duty to seek an abortion, because
the duty to mitigate only requires that “reasonable” actions be taken.71
Act: is EPA Following its Statutory Mandate? 16 HARV ENVTL. L. REV.
343, 357 (1992) (“[T]he existence of the presumptive norm derived from
the CTGs [Control Technique Guidelines] encourages states to view
requests for a deviation with a jaundiced eye . . . .”).
68.

See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 278 (1993)
(“[T]he right to abortion has been described in our opinions as one element
of a more general right of privacy”(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–
153 (1973))).

69.

Adi Youcht, The Plasticity of the Body, the Injury, and the Claim:
Personal Injury Claims in the Era of Plastic Surgeries, 25 WM. & MARY
J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 353, 372 (2019) (“A basic principle
in tort law is that the plaintiff does not deserve compensation for damages
which she or he could have prevented, and that a duty to mitigate damages
is imposed on him or her.”).

70.

See Girdley v. Coats, 825 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Mo. 1992) (en banc), (“In the
case of a pregnancy caused by a negligent sterilization procedure, either
adoption or abortion would clearly mitigate the expense of raising the
child. These options illustrate the difficulty in applying strict tort
principles to damages from wrongful conception.”).

71.

Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Wis. 1990) (“We do not
agree that the refusal of the Marciniaks to abort the unplanned child or
give it up for adoption should be considered as a failure of the parents to
mitigate their damages. The rules requiring mitigation of damages require
only that reasonable measures be taken.”); Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. of
Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 (Ohio 1989) (“[I]n a ‘wrongful
pregnancy’ action, the mother need not mitigate damages by abortion or
adoption since a tort victim has no duty to make unreasonable efforts to
diminish or avoid prospective damages.”); Sorkin v. Lee, 434 N.Y.S.2d
300, 301 (App. Div. 1980) (“On the facts of this case, however, abortion
was a legitimate medical option. Plaintiffs were free to elect it or not, but
their decision should not affect defendant potential liability.”); Morris v.
Frudenfeld, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (“[I]n a case of
‘wrongful birth,’ such as the case at bench, a mother, married, or
unmarried, cannot be required, under the legal doctrine that a plaintiff
take reasonable measures to mitigate damages, to undergo an abortion or
place her unwanted child for adoption.”).
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That said, one court has suggested that whether an abortion would be
reasonable might “rest on a number of factors, including the stage to
which pregnancy has progressed, the health and condition of the woman
at that time and the professional judgment and counsel received.”72
Abortion has played an important role within the prenatal tort
jurisprudence in another respect. Some states have barred recovery by
statute if the plaintiff is basing her claim on her having been wrongfully
denied the opportunity to abort her pregnancy.73 The headings or
subheadings of these statutes sometimes expressly state that wrongful
life or wrongful birth actions are prohibited.74 But a closer look at the
language of the statute itself may reveal that the legislature was trying
to prohibit a particular kind of wrongful life or wrongful birth action,
namely, one in which the plaintiff claims that she was harmed in that
but for the defendant’s negligence, an abortion would have obtained
and the child would never have been born. The difficulty pointed to
here is that a wrongful birth (or wrongful life) action might also be
72.

Ziemba v. Sternberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974).

73.

See OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 63, § 1-741.12(C) (2019) (“In a wrongful life
action or a wrongful birth action, no damages may be recovered for any
condition that existed at the time of a child’s birth if the claim is that the
defendant’s act or omission contributed to the mother’s not having
obtained an abortion”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1906(a) (2020). The statute
reads:
No civil action may be commenced in any court for a claim of
wrongful life or wrongful birth, and no damages may be recovered
in any civil action for any physical condition of a minor that
existed at the time of such minor’s birth if the damages sought
arise out of a claim that a person’s action or omission contributed
to such minor’s mother not obtaining an abortion.
Id. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424, subdiv. 1-2 (West 2019). The statute
states:
No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of
damages on behalf of that person based on the claim that but for
the negligent conduct of another, the person would have been
aborted.
No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive an award of
damages on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of
another, a child would have been aborted.
Id. IDAHO CODE § 5-334(1) (2020) (“A cause of action shall not arise, and
damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim
that but for the act or omission of another, a person would not have been
permitted to have been born alive but would have been aborted.”).

74.

See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (2) (“Wrongful birth action prohibited”);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (1) (“Wrongful life action prohibited”); MO.
REV. STAT. § 188.130 (1986) (“No cause of action for wrongful life”); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1906 (“Wrongful life or wrongful birth claims;
prohibited”); N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 32-03-43 (West) (“Wrongful life
action prohibited”).
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premised on a claim that but for the negligence of a professional, the
plaintiff would never have gotten pregnant—the couple would never
have conceived if the genetic counselor had correctly apprised them that
they were both carriers of a particular disease.75 Because wrongful life
or wrongful birth actions might be predicated on the defendant’s alleged
negligence having resulted in the conception of a child, a statute
precluding damages where the alleged harm is in the lost opportunity
to abort does not bar wrongful birth or wrongful life actions as a general
matter but only bars a subset of them.
In Molloy v. Meier, the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized that
the Minnesota law at issue barred wrongful birth actions based on that
claim that but for the medical professional’s negligence an abortion
would have been secured.76 Because the plaintiffs were instead claiming
that their child would never have been conceived but for defendants’
negligent failure to diagnose a genetic disorder in a previous child,77 the
court characterized the suit as involving wrongful conception rather
than wrongful birth and held that the statute did not bar the cause of
action.78
In Minnesota, plaintiffs bringing a cause of action for wrongful
conception may be awarded the reasonable expenses of raising the child
with an offset for the benefits that the parents have accrued by having
the child.79 Suppose, however, that another jurisdiction limits wrongful
75.

See, e.g., Ginsberg ex rel. Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 117 A.3d
200, 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015), aff’d, Ginsberg ex rel. Ginsberg
v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 147 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2016) (“In essence, plaintiffs
contend that defendants each erred in the health care, genetic testing
services, or genetic counseling they provided before the couple conceived
their daughter upon a mistaken belief that the father was not a Tay–
Sachs carrier.”).

76.

Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Minn. 2004) (“The statute bars
claims that but for the negligence, the pregnancy would have been
aborted. Molloy makes no claim that she would have aborted M.M. if she
had more accurate information about S.F.’s genetic condition.”).

77.

Id. at 713. The court explained:
Kimberly Molloy (Molloy) and her husband, Glenn Molloy,
brought a medical malpractice action against appellants Dr. Diane
Meier, Dr. Reno Backus, and Dr. Kathryn Green, claiming they
were negligent in failing to diagnose a genetic disorder in Molloy’s
daughter and their negligence caused Molloy to conceive another
child with the same genetic disorder.
Id.

78.

Id. at 723 (“Molloy’s action is properly characterized as one for wrongful
conception rather than wrongful birth.”).

79.

Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 170–71 (Minn. 1977). The
court explained:
We hold that in
‘wrongful conception’

cases such
may
be
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conception/pregnancy damages so that the extraordinary expenses
associated with raising a child with severe impairments are not
recoverable.80 Suppose further that the parties anticipated and
explained that they were seeking sterilization precisely because they
feared that any child they produced would have a terrible disease. If
the sterilization were negligently performed in this kind of case and
their cause of action were characterized as a wrongful pregnancy case
rather than a wrongful birth case, then they might not be able to
recover the monies that they needed to adequately provide for their
severely impaired child.

II. Other Kinds of Medical Negligence in the
Prebirth Context
The prenatal torts are predicated on a state’s recognizing that a
plaintiff might be worse off by virtue of a child having been born than
that person would have been had the child never lived. In other kinds
of cases, the plaintiff asserts that but for defendant’s negligence, their
child would have lived a better life. This difference is viewed by many
courts and legislatures as important—it may affect what damages are
recoverable or, perhaps, whether liability will be imposed at all.
Regrettably, courts sometimes conflate these different types of tort
actions, and plaintiffs are wrongly denied recovery.
A.

Distinguishing Among Torts

Courts sometimes suggest that the prenatal torts are not really
special causes of action but instead are simply shorthand ways of

compensatory damages may be recovered by the parents of the
unplanned child. These damages may include all prenatal and
postnatal medical expenses, the mother’s pain and suffering
during pregnancy and delivery, and loss of consortium.
Additionally, the parents may recover the reasonable costs
of rearing the unplanned child subject to offsetting the value of
the child’s aid, comfort, and society during the parents’ life
expectancy.
Id.
80.

See, e.g., Simmerer v. Dabbas, 733 N.E.2d 1169, 1171 (Ohio 2000). The
court clarified in the following way:
The question raised by this case is whether damages associated
with parenting a child born with a birth defect are recoverable in
a wrongful pregnancy action stemming from a negligently
performed sterilization procedure, when the doctor who performed
the unsuccessful sterilization procedure could not have reasonably
foreseen the birth defect. We hold that they are not.
Id.
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describing a kind of medical negligence.81 Yet, in practice that is not
how many courts and legislature are treating these causes of action,
which is why it is important to understand and prevent the kinds of
conflation that sometimes occur.
The Ohio Supreme Court suggested that “overreliance on terms
such as ‘wrongful life’ or ‘wrongful birth’ creates the risk of confusion
in applying principles of tort law to actual cases.”82 That confusion may
arise because the terms are used in different ways in different
jurisdictions,83 for example, a particular set of facts might be treated as
involving wrongful pregnancy in one jurisdiction84 and wrongful birth
in another.85
When courts try to explain how the prenatal torts differ from other
kinds of prebirth medical negligence, they often focus on the role played
by the negligence. The South Carolina Supreme Court explained,
“Wrongful life and wrongful birth actions differ from a typical medical
malpractice action because the negligent act or omission of the health
care provider did not actually cause the impairment or defective
condition.”86 The Indiana Supreme Court made a similar point when
noting that the plaintiffs did “not claim that the negligence of
Healthcare Providers ‘caused’ their child’s defects . . . [but] that
Healthcare Providers’ negligence caused them to lose the ability to
terminate the pregnancy and thereby avoid the costs associated with
carrying and giving birth to a child with severe defects.”87 By
81.

See C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah 1988) (“Courts essentially
view wrongful pregnancy actions as indistinguishable from ordinary
medical malpractice actions where a plaintiff alleges a physician’s breach
of duty and injury resulting therefrom.”).

82.

Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1163–64 (Ohio 2000).

83.

See Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 65 (S.C. 2004) (“The terms are used to
describe a variety of cases arising under different factual circumstances,
and courts have recognized the terms are somewhat misleading and not
always used in a consistent manner.”).

84.

See generally Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 2004).

85.

See Willis, 607 S.E.2d at 66 (“A ‘wrongful birth’ action is brought by the
parent of a child born with an impairment or birth defect.”).

86.

Id. at 67.

87.

Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1219 (Ind. 2000) . See also Keel v.
Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993). The court explained:
The nature of the tort of wrongful birth has nothing to do
with whether a defendant caused the injury or harm to the child,
but, rather,
with whether the defendant’s negligence was the
proximate cause of the parents’ being deprived of the option
of avoiding a conception or, in the case of pregnancy, making
an informed and meaningful decision either to terminate the
pregnancy or to give birth to a potentially defective child.
Id.
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emphasizing that nature (or the parents’ genes) rather than the alleged
tortfeasor had been responsible for the debilitating condition, courts
have sometimes indicated their unwillingness to award damages when
the tortfeasor was not causally responsible for the existence of the
condition itself, even if causally responsible for the child not having
been aborted and thus in some sense responsible for the child living in
the world with the condition.88
Several state legislatures have made clear that their refusal to
permit wrongful birth or wrongful life actions does not preclude cases
where the negligence resulted in harm such that the child’s life would
have been better but for the negligence. Idaho’s barring causes of action
predicated on having lost the opportunity to abort does “not preclude
causes of action based on claims that, but for a wrongful act or
omission, . . . disability, disease, defect or deficiency of an individual
prior to birth would have been prevented, cured or ameliorated in a
manner that preserved the health and life of the affected individual.”89
States so distinguishing implicitly claim that there is an important
difference between the prenatal torts and other kinds of torts involving
prebirth negligence. Parents can seek damages if their child’s life is
made worse by a medical professional’s negligence but cannot seek
damages if the negligence resulted in the child’s birth,90 even though in
both cases the parents might need the support to relieve their child’s
suffering.
Some legislatures have a different concern in mind, namely, that
medical professionals should not be liable for their prenatal torts based
on negligence but may be held liable for their prenatal torts that are
intentional or, perhaps, reckless.91 The Michigan Legislature enacted
88.

See, e.g., Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Fam. Health Ctr., P.S.C.,
120 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Ky. 2003) (as amended Aug. 27, 2003). The court
recognized:
Although the parents in the instant cases allege that their injury
was in being deprived of accurate medical information that would
have led them to seek an abortion, we are unwilling to equate the
loss of an abortion opportunity resulting in a genetically or
congenitally impaired human life, even severely impaired, with a
cognizable legal injury.
Id. See also Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d
1191, 1195 (Colo. 1988) (“In the usual wrongful life case, the defendant’s
negligence does not create the impaired condition, but it is a cause of the
child’s birth.”).

89.

CODE § 5-334(2) (2020); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 63, § 1-741.12(D)
(2019), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1906 (b) (West 2013), and ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (4) (2020).

90.

See IDAHO CODE § 5-334(2). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1741.12(D); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1906(B); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2931(4).

91.

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2971 (4) (2020). The statute states:
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such a law92 after a Michigan intermediate appellate court had held that
the state did not permit wrongful birth actions.93 Unsurprisingly, an
important issue to resolve in cases implicating such a statute is whether
the professional’s wrongful act was merely negligent rather than reckless
or intentional.94
B.

Which Kinds of Scenarios Should Not Fall within Prenatal Tort
Jurisprudence?

There are a number of kinds of scenarios in which a defendant’s
negligence results in the birth of a child with severe handicaps.
The prohibition stated in subsection [precluding actions for
wrongful birth, wrongful life, or wrongful conception/pregnancy]
. . . applies regardless of whether the child is born healthy or with
a birth defect or other adverse medical condition. The prohibition
. . . does not apply to a civil action for damages for an intentional
or grossly negligent act or omission, including, but not limited to,
an act or omission that violates the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA
328, MCL 750.1 to 750.568.
Id. IOWA CODE § 613.15 B(3)(a)(b) (2020). The statute states:
[T]he prohibitions specified in this section shall not apply to any
of the following: A civil action for damages for an intentional or
grossly negligent act or omission, including any act or omission
that constitutes a public offense. A civil action for damages for
the intentional failure of a physician to comply with the duty imposed by licensure pursuant to chapter 148 to provide a patient
with all information reasonably necessary to make decisions about
a pregnancy.
Id. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719 (D) (2020) (“This section [precluding
damages
for
wrongful
life,
wrongful
birth
or
wrongful
pregnancy/conception] does not apply to any civil action for damages for
an intentional or grossly negligent act or omission, including an act or
omission that violates a criminal law.”).
92.

See Wilson v. Mercy Hosp., 2003 WL 245823, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)
(“[P]laintiff cited M.C.L. § 600.2971, in which the Legislature codified the
abolition of the wrongful birth cause of action with regard to ordinary
negligence but indicated that a cause of action based on gross negligence
was permissible.”). See also Messenger v. Heos, 2008 WL 5158901, at n.3
(Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“The Legislature has since abolished claims
for wrongful birth, wrongful life, and wrongful conception, except in cases
involving an intentional or grossly negligent act or omission. MCL
600.2971. Though not mentioned by counsel, the general effective date for
the legislation was March 28, 2001.”).

93.

Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]his
case revolves around the wrongful birth tort. In this opinion, we address
the basic question whether, absent legislative action, such a tort has a
rightful place in our jurisprudence. We conclude that it does not.”).

94.

See Cichewicz v. Salesin, 854 N.W.2d 901, 904 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014)
(discussing whether a physician inaccurately telling a patient that “her
fallopian tubes were blocked and, therefore, it was no longer necessary for
her to use contraceptives” was negligent rather than reckless behavior).
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Sometimes, the negligence is in the failure to give or interpret tests, and
sometimes in the failure to communicate test results in a timely way.
These kinds of negligence are paradigmatic prenatal tort cases because
the medical professional neither does anything to bring about the
existence of the handicap nor does anything to prevent the correction
or amelioration of the condition.95 Instead, the professional fails to
communicate to the parent important, time-sensitive information that
would have affected her decision to conceive or to carry a pregnancy to
term.96
Other kinds of negligence play a different causal role in the process
by which a child is born into the world with a disability. Suppose that
a pregnant woman is negligently exposed to X-rays97 or to a drug98 that
negatively impacts the developing fetus. The child later has the
difficulties associated with that harmful exposure.99 In this kind of case,
the fetus is alive at the time of exposure and the harm may manifest
after birth.100 When the child (or a next friend) sues for damages, the
claim is that but for the alleged negligence, the child would have lived
his or her life without the debilitating condition resulting from the
exposure to the harmful substance. In these kinds of cases, the focus is
not on the particular mechanism by which the tortfeasor’s negligence
95.

See, e.g., Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 409
(Iowa 2017).

96.

See, e.g., id. at 399.

97.

See, e.g., Complete Family Care v. Sprinkle, 638 So. 2d 774 (Ala. 1994)
(malpractice case involving negligent exposure to X-rays during
pregnancy).

98.

See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. 1982)
(“[P]laintiff alleged that her 1953 prenatal exposure to DES, ingested by
her mother while pregnant with plaintiff, was the proximate cause of the
cancer that developed 17 years after her birth in 1954.”).

99.

See Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)
(“In 1971, researchers reported a statistical link between fetal exposure to
DES during pregnancy and the subsequent development of cancer of the
reproductive organs in the female offspring.”).

100. A separate issue involves the conditions under which a fetus (by her next
friend) may sue for wrongful death. See Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444
N.W.2d 236, 238 (Mich. App. 1989). The court offered the following
analysis:
The crucial issue presented in this case is whether a wrongful
death action may be maintained on behalf of a fetus that was not
viable at the time of the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct but which
was viable at the time of the resulting injury. We conclude that
such an action is appropriate.
Id. Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 788
(Mich. App. 1994) (“A negligence action may also be maintained if the
fetus was viable at the time of the injury.”) (citing O’Neill v. Morse, 188
N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971)).

241

Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021
Prenatal Tort Slippage

brings about harm, for example, whether the exposure to X-rays causes
an alteration in fetal genes leading to the child’s suffering some
affliction. Instead, the focus is on whether the child born would have
lived a better life but for the negligence.
When assessing damages, the jury is not asked to contemplate the
allegedly imponderable question of whether it would have been better
never to have lived at all than to have lived with a particular condition
or, perhaps, how much a child was harmed by having been forced to
live with a particular condition rather than never having lived at all.101
Instead, the jury is asked to assess the harm in a child’s having been
forced to endure a particular condition rather than in having lived life
without that condition.102
While juries may have some difficulty103 in assessing in dollar terms
how much an individual should be compensated for these harms, e.g.,
possibly severe mental impairment,104 juries are nonetheless assigned
that task.105 If juries were thought unable to make these kinds of
judgments, then they would be precluded from awarding damages in a
variety of kinds of cases.106 Further, were the difficulties posed by
calculating the “correct” assessment of damages enough to justify
precluding recovery, tortfeasors would reap a windfall because they
would not be forced to pay for the harm that they had negligently
caused.107
101. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
102. See Hensel, supra note 55, at 160.
103. Cf. Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) (“If
defendants’ negligence caused physical injury to the fetus, our cases would
require the jury to compare the unknowable value of the child’s life
without affliction against its almost equally unknowable future value with
the affliction”).
104. See McNulty v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 905–06 (Mass. 1993) (“On
January 4, 1978, she gave birth to Keri Ann. Keri Ann was born with
numerous congenital defects attributable to congenital rubella syndrome,
including deafness, blindness, severe mental retardation and heart
defects.”).
105. Walker by Pizano, 790 P.2d at 739 (“The difficult problem of quantifying
general damages should not have prevented the courts from awarding such
damages if in fact an injury had occurred. It is the genius of the common
law that difficult damage questions are left to juries.”).
106. See, e.g., Stelma v. Juguilon, 597 N.E.2d 523, 532 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(discussing jury award for medical negligence resulting in quadriplegia);
Drust v. Drust, 113 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8 (1980) (“At bench the jury rendered
a general verdict in favor of plaintiff awarding him damages in the sum
of $1,436,000. In view of the catastrophic injuries and losses disclosed
by the evidence, including the resulting permanent blindness, we cannot
say that as a matter of law the award is excessive merely because it is
large.”).
107. See Gregory L. Ash, Toxic Torts and Latent Diseases: The Case for an
Increased Risk Cause of Action, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 1087, 1097 (1990)
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Some of the prebirth negligence cases do not involve fetal exposure
to toxic substances but, instead, conduct that occurs prior to the
victim’s conception. For example, a physician might fail to timely
administer RhoGAM108 to an Rh-negative mother who delivers an Rhpositive child.109 Future Rh-positive children born to such a woman will
be at risk for a variety of conditions,110 and the potential harm caused
by the failure to administer the RhoGAM in a timely way will not be
removed by a later injection.111
A number of points might be made about causes of action involving
a failure to administer RhoGAM at the correct time. The woman herself
is unlikely to be harmed by the failure to administer RhoGAM,112 and
the individual who is likely to be harmed does not exist at the time the

(“The tortfeasors enjoy a windfall, in that they are not forced to pay
damages for the full extent of the harm that their actions have caused.”).
See also Pollicina v. Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr., 187 A.D.2d 217, 220,
aff’d as modified, N.E.2d 974 (N.Y. 1993) (“To enable . . . a tortfeasor to
achieve an unjustified windfall at the expense of the injured plaintiff is
simply unacceptable.”).
108. See Theodore R. LeBlang, Medical Malpractice and Physician
Accountability: Trends in the Courts and Legislative Responses, 3 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 105, 111 n.21 (1994) (“RhoGAM is used to prevent the
formation of antibodies in situations where an Rh-negative pregnant
woman gives birth to a child with Rh-positive blood.”).
109. See James v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 744 P.2d 695, 698 (Ariz. 1987)
(“The malpractice allegedly occurred when the doctor failed to administer
RhoGAM to the wife within seventy-two hours after delivering her first
child.”).
110. See Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 1992) (“In 1980, she
became pregnant again and, in May 1981, gave birth to Nathan, who had
Rh positive blood. Nathan alleged that he suffered anemia and respiratory
problems as a result of the defendants’ negligence in improperly
interpreting his mother’s blood type and in failing to
administer RhoGAM following the birth of his older sibling.”); id. The
court noted:
In 1984, Mrs. Walker became pregnant and, in February 1985,
delivered Kathy and Jennifer. Kathy has Rh positive blood and
alleges that the defendants’ negligence caused her to have hearing
impairments, motor skill deficiencies and possible mental
retardation. Jennifer has Rh negative blood and alleges that the
defendants’ negligence has caused her to suffer asthma.
Id.
111. Id. (“[S]he had already formed the antibodies following the birth of her
first child; once formed, the administration of RhoGAM does nothing to
remove the antibodies.”).
112. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 240
(Tenn. 2015) (discussing testimony that “the health risks to an Rhsensitized woman are ‘extremely remote’”).
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negligent behavior occurs.113 Further, the identity or even DNA of the
possible victim is not known. For example, once the Rh-negative woman
becomes sensitized, any Rh-positive child she later carries will be at
risk.
The Missouri Supreme Court offered an analogy to show why the
fact that the negligent act occurred prior to the victim’s existence need
not foreclose recovery:
Assume a balcony is negligently constructed. Two years later, a
mother and her one-year-old child step onto the balcony and it
gives way, causing serious injuries to both the mother and the
child. It would be ludicrous to suggest that only the mother would
have a cause of action against the builder but, because the infant
was not conceived at the time of the negligent conduct, no duty
of care existed toward the child.114

The fact that the child was not in existence at the time of the
negligence would not prevent the harm from occurring later. Further,
the analogy suggests that liability would be imposed whether the oneyear-old child on the balcony was the woman’s biological child or
instead someone she was babysitting. But this means that the
important consideration is not which child in particular is harmed by
this negligent failure to administer RhoGAM, but that any Rh-positive
child she carries in the future will be at risk for severe harm. The
physician will still be liable even if the child is conceived by the woman
113. See Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 595 (“[T]he only reason for the administration
of RhoGAM was for the benefit of future children who may be born.”).
114. Lough by Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo.
1993). Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789–
90 (Mich. App. 1994). The court offered the following hypothetical:
[A]ssume a party had his furnace repaired and the work was
defective so that the next heating sea-son fumes are released
killing a newborn child. We would conclude that the injury
occurred when the fumes were released, not when the furnace was
repaired. Nor would the infant be denied a cause of action because
it was not in existence at the time of the negligent repair.
Id. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir.
1973). The court reasoned:
If the view prevailed that tortious conduct occurring prior to
conception is not actionable in behalf of an infant ultimately
injured by the wrong, then an infant suffering personal injury from
a defective food product, manufactured before his conception,
would be without remedy. Such reasoning runs counter to the
various principles of recovery which Oklahoma recognizes for
those ultimately suffering injuries proximately caused by a
defective product or instrumentality manufactured and placed on
the market by the defendant.
Id.
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and someone she did not even know at the time she failed to receive
the RhoGAM injection.
A physician who fails to timely administer RhoGAM may not in
fact cause harm, for example, because the patient does not even try to
have any more children. But the possibility that the negligence might
not have resulted in harm to another person does not relieve the
tortfeasor from liability if in fact the negligence causes harm. Similarly,
a builder who negligently constructs a balcony might not cause anyone
harm because the entire building might be destroyed to make room for
a high rise before the balcony can give way and cause serious injury.
But the mere fact that it might not have caused injury would not
immunize the negligent builder if in fact the balcony collapsed and
resulted in injury or death.
There are other kinds of cases in which the negligent act occurs
prior to the victim’s conception. In Monusko v. Postle, a Michigan
appellate court held that a physician who failed to administer a rubella
test and who failed to immunize a woman against rubella was liable for
harm to a later-conceived child who suffered from rubella syndrome.115
The court reasoned “[t]he tests and immunization, relatively simple and
straight-forward to administer, are designed specifically to alleviate the
sort of injuries we have in this case. It is readily foreseeable that
someone not immunized may catch rubella and, if pregnant, bear a
child suffering from rubella syndrome.”116
Monusko should be distinguished from a case in which a physician
negligently failed to diagnose rubella in a pregnant woman and
negligently failed to advise the woman about the potential harm that
rubella posed to the developing fetus.117 In the latter case, the physician
did not do anything to cause the pregnant woman to contract rubella
nor did the failure to warn prevent the developing fetus from receiving
ameliorative care.118 The latter case would involve a wrongful birth
claim,119 but would not involve the claim that the child would have
lived a better life but for the negligent action of the physician. In
Monusko, the claim was that but for the physician’s negligence in failing
to immunize the woman against rubella, the later-conceived child would
have lived and would not have suffered from the conditions associated
with rubella syndrome. Here, too, it does not matter whether the child
subject to the rubella syndrome is a particular child, e.g., is later
115. See Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369–70 (Mich. App. 1989).
116. Id. at 369.
117. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 342 (N.H. 1986).
118. Id. at 343 (“The plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants caused Linda
to conceive her child or to contract rubella, or that the defendants could
have prevented the effects of the disease on the fetus.”).
119. Id. at 348 (“We hold that New Hampshire recognizes a cause of action for
wrongful birth.”).

245

Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021
Prenatal Tort Slippage

conceived by the unvaccinated woman and her first husband or, instead,
is conceived with a subsequent mate.
C.

Negligence in the ART Context

Courts have had some difficulty in deciding whether tortious
conduct in the context of assisted reproductive techniques is more
appropriately analyzed in terms of the prenatal tort jurisprudence or,
instead, in terms of the jurisprudence involved other kinds of prebirth
negligence. That uncertainty is regrettable because it has resulted in
tortfeasors escaping responsibility for the harms they have imposed on
innocent victims.
There are a variety of ways that negligence can undermine wouldbe parents’ hopes and expectations in the ART context, as should be
clear when one considers that individuals having difficulty conceiving a
child might use in vitro fertilization (IVF) to increase the probability
that they can create a viable embryo with their own gametes. Or, in
the alternative, couples might make use of donated eggs or sperm to
help them create a child genetically related to one of them. Or, the
couple might use both donated eggs and sperm.120 Precisely because
various individuals’ gametes might be used, there is the possibility that
someone will make a mistake and fertilization will involve the wrong
gametes.
Consider Andrews v. Keltz.121 The plaintiffs, Nancy and Thomas
Andrews, contracted with the defendants to perform an IVF procedure
so that Nancy’s eggs would be fertilized with Thomas’s sperm in the
hopes that the couple could have a child genetically related to both of
them, but the defendants allegedly fertilized Nancy’s eggs with the
wrong sperm.122
The focus in Andrews was on the possible harm to the Mr. and Mrs.
Andrews and to their child, Jessica. There was no evidence that Jessica
suffered from any affliction as a result of the alleged negligence, and
many of the cases cited in the opinion precluded recovery for negligence
resulting in the birth of a healthy child.123 But the cases cited involved

120. States have taken into account that couples might make use of donated
gametes to help grow their families. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-702
(2019) (“A married couple who, under the supervision of a licensed
physician, engage in assisted reproduction through use of donated eggs,
sperm, or both, will be treated at law as if they are the sole natural and
legal parents of a child conceived thereby.”).
121. Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
122. Id. at 365.
123. See id. at 367.
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wrongful pregnancy claims where a healthy child had been born after
an unsuccessful tubal ligation,124 vasectomy,125 or abortion.126
Using the prenatal torts jurisprudence to analyze whether there
should be recovery in Andrews is problematic, at least in part, because
the parents did not claim that they were harmed by virtue of having
Jessica rather than in not having any child at all. On the contrary, they
wanted to have a child, but they wanted the child to be genetically
related to both of them rather than to only one of them.127
One of the complicating issues in Andrews was that there was a
racial element to the claim. The Andrews were a bi-racial couple and
they claimed to have been alerted to the negligence because their
daughter Jessica had physical characteristics that they had not
expected.128 When denying their claim, the court may well have been
suggesting that a tort action based on the child having been born of
the “wrong” racial makeup simply is not cognizable.129
124. See O’Toole v. Greenberg, 477 N.E.2d 445, 446 (N.Y. 1985) (“According
to plaintiffs’ verified complaint, on January 11, 1980, a tubal ligation
procedure was negligently performed upon plaintiff Susanne O’Toole while
under the care of defendants, Benjamin Greenberg, M.D., Arthur Leber,
M.D., and the Jamaica Hospital and Family Practice Clinic.”).
125. Weintraub v. Brown, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(“Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants Brown, Pappu, and Lawrence
Hospital performed the vasectomy and subsequent studies in a negligent
manner, and that the negligence was compounded by Dr. Brown’s failure
to arrange for a postsurgical sperm count.”).
126. Jean-Charles v. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Mohawk Valley, Inc., 471
N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“The complaint alleges that as
a consequence of the defendants’ negligent performance of an abortion
upon plaintiff Marie Danielle Jean-Charles, she gave birth to a healthy
baby.”).
127. See Andrews, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 369 (discussing the “plaintiffs’ assertion
that they have stated a cause of action for emotional distress based upon
having a child who is not the biological child of Mr. Andrews and who is
a different race and color than the Andrews . . . .”).
128. Id. at 365. The court explained:
According to plaintiffs, shortly after their daughter Jessica was
born in October 2004, they knew something was amiss based upon
Jessica’s physical characteristics. Mrs. Andrews “was born in the
Dominican Republic and has a complexion, skin coloration and
facial characteristics typical of that region” while Mr. Andrews is
Caucasian. (Andrews’ affidavit, ¶ 11). The Andrews describe
Jessica “darker skinned” than both of them, with “skin, facial and
hair characteristics more typical of African, or African–American
descent.”
Id.
129. In Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, 2014 WL 4853400 (Ill. Cir. Ct.),
the plaintiff sued because she had been given the wrong sperm by a sperm
bank, and the child born was “a beautiful, obviously mixed race, baby
girl.” Id. at ¶ 22. The plaintiff claimed harm because the family lived in
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The Andrews argued that they had been harmed because the
defendant’s negligence had prevented their both being genetically
related to their child. The court rejected that claim as too
“speculative,”130 relying on Cohen v. Cabrini Medical Center,131 where
an individual who had been having great difficulty fathering a child was
denied recovery for “wrongful nonbirth.”132 But Cohen was alleging
negligence in the performance of a procedure that might have increased
his chances of fathering a child.133 Given the difficulties that Cohen and
his wife had previously had in conceiving,134 the court’s refusing to find
that but for the negligence the couple would have been able to conceive
coitally was unsurprising.
Yet, unlike in Cohen, there was no suggestion in Andrews that the
husband would have had difficulty in fathering a child. Indeed, the
court suggested that the Andrews were not barred from recovery for
the possibility that his genetic material had been used by a different
couple to create a child.135 But if that is so, then the court was not
suggesting that it was too speculative to assert that the use of Andrews’
sperm might have led to a live birth, for example, because a very low

a conservative community where the child, Payton, would not be
welcomed. Id. at ¶¶ 26–27. The suit was ultimately dismissed. See
Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, LLC, No. 2–16–0694, 2017 WL
2800062, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. June 27, 2017). It may be that
the Cramblett court was refusing sub silentio to base liability upon the
private biases of others. See Dov Fox, Making Things Right When
Reproductive Medicine Goes Wrong: Reply to Robert Rabin, Carol
Sanger, and Gregory Keating, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 94, 107 (2018)
(“[R]ecovery could dignify those ‘private biases’ to which, the Supreme
Court has held in the custody context, ‘the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give . . . effect.’”) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984)).
130. Andrews, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
131. See Cohen v. Cabrini Med. Ctr., 30 N.E.2d 949 (N.Y. 2000).
132. Id. at 950–53.
133. See id. at 950 (“Cohen decided to undergo a bilateral varicolectomy, a
surgical procedure to enhance his fertility.”).
134. Id. (discussing the couple’s “unsuccessful efforts to conceive”).
135. Andrews, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 369 (Sup. Ct. 2007). The court noted:
But plaintiffs also claim that there is continuing uncertainty and
distrust as to whether the genetic material of either or both of
them has been inappropriately used for others and that they may
have natural children or half children that they are unaware
of . . . Such a claim is not barred by any public policy
consideration.
Id.
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sperm count would have been unlikely to lead to impregnation.136 But
if the latter claim was not too speculative, it is difficult to see why the
Andrews’ claim that they might have had a child genetically related to
both of them was too speculative.
A separate issue involves the calculation of damages. Many couples
raise children who are not genetically related to both of them,137 so the
alleged harm involved in both parties’ not being genetically related to
the child they were raising might not be thought great. Nonetheless,
merely because many couples are elated to raise a child who happens
to be genetically related to only one of them or, perhaps, to neither of
them does not establish a lack of harm to the Andrews when each of
them had fervently hoped to be genetically related to the child.138
Suppose that the Andrews example is modified. Suppose that Nancy
and Thomas Andrews make use of IVF. The medical professional uses
the correct sperm to fertilize the eggs, but performs the procedure
negligently. Jessica has various handicaps attributable to this
negligence. This kind of case is relatively straightforward. But for the
negligence, the law will presume that Jessica would have been born,
and without the handicaps.139
It might be thought too speculative to assume that Jessica would
in fact have been born at all, and even more speculative that she would
have been born without the affliction.140 After all, many IVF attempts
do not lead to a live birth.141 Nonetheless, “[i]n an ordinary prenatal-

136. Cf. Rucinski v. Rucinski, 431 N.W.2d 241, 242 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(discussing an individual who “had a very low sperm count and a
correspondingly low likelihood of impregnating”).
137. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward A Unified Field Theory of the Fam.:
The Am. Law Inst.’s Principles of the Law of Fam. Dissolution,
2001 BYU L. REV. 923, 927 (2001) (discussing ”explosions in
the number of children raised in households with a stepparent”).
138. Cf. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent”? The
Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
353, 389 (1991). Hill explained:
It is beyond dispute that an important aspect of parenthood is the
experience of creating another in one’s “own likeness.” Part of
what makes parenthood meaningful is the parent’s ability to see
the child grow and develop and see oneself in the process of this
growth. Through this process, the parent views himself or herself
as a creative agent in nature.
Id.
139. Contra Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (citing
Weintraub v. Brown, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634, 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)).
140. See supra notes 129–137 and accompanying text (discussing the
Andrews’ “speculative” non-birth claim).
141. Cf. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice:
An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L.
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injury case, if the defendant had not been negligent, then the child
would have been born healthy.”142 Further, it should not matter that
the negligence did not occur post-conception, just as it was not
necessary for the negligence to occur post-conception in the cases
involving the negligent failure to administer RhoGAM.143
Suppose that the Andrews case is modified yet again. This time,
Jessica has a debilitating disease as a result of the medical professional
negligently using the wrong sperm to fertilize Nancy’s eggs. The
Andrews family sues, claiming that Jessica would have been born
without the handicaps but for the negligence and thus that the medical
professional is liable. The Andrews would not be claiming that the harm
was in the child’s having the wrong eye color, hair color, or DNA, but
in the child’s having severe deficits that the child would not have had
but for the defendant’s negligence.144 It is not true in the relevant sense
that “the same negligent preconception conduct that harmed him also
accounts for the overall benefit of his existence,”145 because the nonnegligent preconception conduct would (presumably) have afforded the
overall benefit of existence without the harm attributable to the
negligence.146

REV. 55, 59 (1999) (“In 1996, the average live birth rate per ovarian
stimulation procedure at IVF programs nationwide was 25.9 percent.”).
142. Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 698 (Ill.
1987), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. Children’s Mem’l Hosp.,
955 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. 2011) (citing Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 367
N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977)).
143. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. Indeed, the child harmed
in a RhoGAM case might have been born years after the negligence took
place. See also Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 1992) (“[A]t
the time of the birth of her first child in June 1976, no RhoGAM injections
were given to Mrs. Walker.”); id. The court explained:
In 1980, she became pregnant again and, in May 1981, gave birth
to Nathan, who had Rh positive blood. Nathan alleged that he
suffered anemia and respiratory problems as a result of the
defendants’ negligence in improperly interpreting his mother’s
blood type and in failing to administer RhoGAM following the
birth of his older sibling.
Id.
144. Cf. Matthew Browne, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted
Reproduction: Applying a Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2555, 2592 (2001) (discussing “a case in which the tortfeasor is
responsible, through preconception negligence, for both conception and
specific injury.”).
145. Dov Fox, Interest Creep, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 301 (2014).
146. See Browne, supra note 144, at 2587 (“In preconception tort cases, the
plaintiff would have enjoyed existence without impairment if not for the
defendant’s negligence.”).
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Here, two different scenarios might be imagined. In one scenario,
the tortfeasor negligently uses the wrong sperm and in addition
negligently performs the procedure, thereby causing the child to have a
devastating disease. In the other scenario, the negligence lies in the
tortfeasor’s using the wrong sperm, resulting in the child having the
very serious condition because of a defective gene. It is not clear why
liability should be imposed in one of these and not in the other. If the
tortfeasor negligently performs the process thereby causing the child to
have a catastrophic condition, liability should be imposed whether or
not the child had the “correct” genes—it would be quite surprising that
the tortfeasor would be immune from liability because he not only
performed the procedure negligently but, in addition, negligently chose
the wrong gametes. Yet, if the tortfeasor is liable when negligently
performing the procedure when helping to create someone using the
wrong gametes, it would be surprising if the tortfeasor’s negligent choice
of the wrong gametes (thereby causing the child to have the devastating
condition) was not itself the basis for a suit by the child. We do not
restrict who can sue by closely examining the DNA in other prebirth
torts; else, the tortfeasor would be immune from suit by his victim as
long as the negligence resulted in a detrimental change to fetal DNA
or, perhaps, to the DNA of the later-conceived child. Further, it is not
as if removing the requirement that the child have a particular DNA
would open up the floodgates to lawsuits,147 because in Andrews, for
example, the mother was genetically related to the child and, in
addition, had given birth to her.148
B.F. v. Reproductive Medicine Associates of New York, LLP
involved a fertility clinic that allegedly inadequately screened the eggs
of a donor,149 notwithstanding the clinic’s promise that it “screened
donor candidates for all known genetic conditions for which testing is

147. See Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788 (1981)Thus, were
we to establish liability in this case, could we logically preclude liability
in a case where a negligent motorist collides with another vehicle
containing a female passenger who sustains a punctured uterus as a result
of the accident and subsequently gives birth to a deformed child?
Unlimited hypotheses accompanied by staggering implications are
manifest. The perimeters of liability although a proper legislative concern,
in cases such as these, cannot be judicially established in a reasonable and
practical manner.
148. See Andrews, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
149. B.F. v. Reprod. Med. Assocs. of New York, LLP (B.F. I), 136 A.D.3d 73,
75 (2015), aff’d, 30 N.Y.3d 608 (2017) (“[I]t is alleged that defendants’
failure to perform adequate genetic screening of an egg donor for an in
vitro fertilization resulted in the conception and birth of plaintiffs’
impaired child.”).
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available.”150 Regrettably, the child born as a result of the use of the
unscreened donor eggs suffered from severe disabilities.151
The B.F. court rejected that there could be any cause of action on
behalf of the son, reasoning that “any cause of action brought against
them on behalf of M.F. [the son] would amount to a ‘wrongful life’ claim
not cognizable under New York law, since the harm alleged by the
complaint is M.F.’s conception and birth.”152 The case cited in support
had been one in which the defendant had not caused the child’s
impairment;153 rather, the defendant either failed to advise that a test
be performed in utero154 or failed to determine that an earlier child had
an inherited condition.155 If there had been no negligence, one couple

150. B.F. v. Reprod. Med. Assocs. of New York, LLP (B.F. II), 92 N.E.3d 766,
768 (N.Y. 2017), reh’g denied, 31 N.Y.3d 991 (2018), and reh’g denied, 31
N.Y.3d 991 (2018).
151. B.F. I, 136 A.D.3d at 84 (Manzanet-Daniels, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Manzanet-Daniels explained:
Infant M.F.’s full Fragile X mutation requires “intensive physical,
occupational, speech and behavioral therapies for several hours a
day, five times per week.” According to plaintiffs, he will require
special education services for the rest of his life, and will most
likely never live independently.
Id. See also Donovan v. Idant Lab’ys., 625 F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D. Pa.
2009), aff’d sub nom. D.D. v. Idant Laby’s., 374 F. App’x 319 (3d Cir.
2010) (denying recovery to child suffering from Fragile X Syndrome,
notwithstanding the lab’s (alleged) negligent failure to discover that the
sperm donor was a Fragile X carrier). See id. at 263 (“On February 16,
1998, plaintiffs’ allege that SmithKline reported that Donna Donovan was
not a Fragile X carrier. On May 6, 1998, it determined that Donor G738
was a carrier.”).
152. B.F. I, 136 A.D.3d at 76 (citing Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 408–
412 (1978)).
153. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. 1978). (“It is not
contended that the defendant physicians’ treatment of Dolores Becker and
Hetty Park caused the abnormalities in their infants”).
154. Id. at 808–09. The court identified:
It is plaintiffs’ contention that throughout the period during which
Dolores Becker was under the care of defendants plaintiffs were
never advised by defendants of the increased risk of Down’s
Syndrome in children born to women over 35 years of age. Nor
were they advised, allege plaintiffs, of the availability of an
amniocentesis test to determine whether the fetus carried by
Dolores Becker would be born afflicted with Down’s Syndrome.
Id.
155. Id. at 809 (“[D]efendants are alleged to have informed plaintiffs that
inasmuch as polycystic kidney disease was not hereditary, the chances of
their conceiving a second child afflicted with this disease were ‘practically
nil’.”).
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would not have conceived a second child156 and the other couple would
have obtained an amniocentesis and then aborted the pregnancy.157
Basically, if there had been no negligence, these parents would simply
not have had the children who were the subjects of the suit. But that
is where the wrongful life cases and B.F. diverge, because in B.F. a child
might well have been born if there had been no negligence.158
In B. F., the clinic failed to diagnose the presence of the relevant
gene and in addition, with the parents’ uninformed consent, fertilized
the eggs (with the undiagnosed condition) with the husband’s sperm
and then implanted the created embryos in the wife. 159 Had different
eggs (without the chromosomal abnormality160) been used to create the
embryos and had the implantation of the embryos resulted in a live
birth, the child born would not have been afflicted with the devastating
conditions.
The B.F. court construed the plaintiff mother’s claim as one for
wrongful birth, because “the child would not have been conceived but
for the defendant’s malpractice.”161 After explaining why the court
would allow the wrongful birth claim to go forward, the court dismissed
various other claims, reasoning that they were “all essentially
redundant of the medical malpractice claim,”162 and “the injury for
which recovery is sought is identical to the injury alleged in support of
the medical malpractice claim.”163 Basically, the court treated the other
causes of action as “legally redundant.”164
Yet, B.F. is not a typical wrongful birth case because the alleged
negligence was not limited to failing to apprise the plaintiff of important

156. Id. at 811 (“Had Hetty and Steven Park been accurately advised by their
physicians of the chances that a future child of theirs would suffer from
polycystic kidney disease, they allege that they would not have chosen to
conceive a second child.”).
157. Id. at 812 (“[H]ad Dolores and Arnold Becker been accurately advised of
the chances that their already conceived child would be born afflicted with
Down’s Syndrome, and of the availability of an amniocentesis test, they
allege that they would have undergone that test, and had it indicated the
presence of Down’s Syndrome in their child, that they would have
terminated the pregnancy”).
158. B.F. I, 136 A.D.3d at 84 (Manzanet-Daniels, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Plaintiffs allege that they would have insisted on
using an egg from a different donor had they known that their donor was
a carrier of Fragile X.”).
159. Id. at 75 (majority opinion).
160. Id. at 76.
161. Id. at 77.
162. Id. at 79–80.
163. Id. at 77.
164. Id. at 81.

253

Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021
Prenatal Tort Slippage

information that would have affected the plaintiff’s decision to abort or
to refrain from conceiving.165 The additional factor in B.F. was that the
reason an abortion might have been sought was itself due to the
tortfeasor’s negligence. Had there been no negligence in B.F., the child
born would not have been afflicted with the debilitating conditions,
whereas in the typical wrongful birth case, no child would have been
born had there been no negligence.
Suppose that because of the negligence of a medical provider, a
child is caused to have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,
suicidal and homicidal ideations, and other conditions.166 Suppose
further that the medical provider became aware of its own negligence
at the beginning of a client’s pregnancy and failed to apprise the client
of the negligence in time for the client to obtain an abortion should she
so desire. 167 Were the negligence to come to light after the child had
been born, one might expect the mother to sue for wrongful birth
(assuming that she would have aborted the pregnancy had she been
timely apprised of the relevant information) and the child (or her next
friend) to have sued for the harms associated with having ADHD,
suicidal and homicidal ideation, and any other harmful conditions
caused by the negligence.
Perhaps the child would be unable to establish that the alleged
negligence in fact caused the harm.168 In that event, the mother might
still be able to proceed, assuming that wrongful birth actions were
cognizable in the jurisdiction.169 Or, perhaps the child could establish
causation but the jurisdiction in question did not recognize wrongful
birth actions. One would not expect the court to dismiss the child’s
cause of action merely because the state did not permit wrongful birth
actions.170 In this case, the child would be alleging that but for the
165. See id. at 79–80.
166. Norman v. Xytex Corp., 830 S.E.2d 267, 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (“[T]he
complaint alleged that A. A. was diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder at age nine, and with Thalassemia Minor, ‘an
inherited blood disorder[.]’ Further, A. A. had ‘suicidal and homicidal
ideations[,]’ and had been prescribed various medications including antidepressants and an anti-psychotic.”).
167. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 308 (1967) (“The first cause
of action is predicated upon negligent treatment in the performance of the
operation. The second cause of action is predicated upon negligent
treatment in failing to correctly apprise plaintiff of the consequences of
the operation.”).
168. Cf. Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 814 (N.J. 1999) (“The
record discloses that plaintiffs presented insufficient proof of a causal
relationship between the drug and the defect that afflicts their son.”).
169. See id. at 820 (reversing summary judgment for defendant and remanding
wrongful birth claim for trial).
170. Cf. Norman, 830 S.E.2d at 268–69. The court noted:
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negligence she would have been born without the debilitating conditions
and thus that she deserved compensation.
When the Kentucky Supreme Court was deciding whether the state
recognized wrongful birth actions, it did so in a context in which a
physician had allegedly been negligent in “failing to correctly diagnose
and/or inform [the plaintiffs] of the fetal medical condition in time for
an abortion.”171 The court rejected that “physicians should be relieved
of any proven contractual responsibility to report to patients the
accurate results of diagnostic procedures, even if the condition is
‘incurable.’”172 Nonetheless, the court was unwilling “to equate the loss
of an abortion opportunity resulting in a genetically or congenitally
impaired human life, even severely impaired, with a cognizable legal
injury.”173
An important difference between the Kentucky case and one in
which the tortfeasor’s negligence causes the child to have adverse
conditions is that in the latter the child was worse off as a result of
what the defendant allegedly did, whereas in the Kentucky case the
child’s harm was not attributable to any negligence on the part of the
doctors.174 Various state courts have emphasized that in the wrongful
birth context the physician did not cause the harm to the child. The
Alabama Supreme Court explained:
The nature of the tort of wrongful birth has nothing to do with
whether a defendant caused the injury or harm to the child, but,
rather, with whether the defendant’s negligence was the
proximate cause of the parents’ being deprived of the option of
The Appellants brought suit against the Appellees for fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, products liability and/or strict
liability, products liability and/or negligence, breach of express
warranty, breach of implied warranty, battery, negligence, unfair
business practices, specific performance, false advertising,
promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, seeking various
damages, including punitive damages, and attorney fees. The
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss arguing, inter alia, that the
complaint alleged claims for ‘wrongful birth,’ which is not a legally
recognized claim in Georgia.
Id. at 269 (“The trial court granted in part and denied in part the
Appellees’ motion, dismissing all the claims with the exception of the
claim for specific performance.”); Id. at 270 (affirming trial court).
171. Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Fam. Health Ctr., P.S.C., 120
S.W.3d 682, 684 (Ky. 2003).
172. Id. at 691.
173. Id. at 689.
174. See id. (footnote omitted) (“The heart of the problem in these cases is
that the physician cannot be said to have caused the defect. The disorder
is genetic and not the result of any injury negligently inflicted by the
doctor.”).
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avoiding a conception or, in the case of pregnancy, making an
informed and meaningful decision either to terminate the
pregnancy or to give birth to a potentially defective child.175

The high courts of Kentucky and Alabama both emphasized the
importance of the lack of connection between the negligence and the
child’s impairment.
D. ART and Public Policy

Negligence in the ART context has much “to do with whether a
defendant caused the injury or harm to the child.”176 Where the lab is
negligent in failing to screen for certain characteristics and that failure
results in a child’s having severe deficits, the negligence has caused the
harm to the child. If the lab had performed its job correctly, the
screening would have revealed that certain gametes should not be used,
which would have meant that other gametes would have been used and
the child born would not have had the terrible condition.

175. Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993). See also Johnson v.
Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1372 (Ohio 1989); C.S. v.
Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah 1988); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d
1202, 1204 (Colo. 1899); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d
691, 695 (Ill. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. Children’s
Mem’l Hosp., 955 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. 2011). The court explained:
The underlying premise is that prudent medical care would have
detected the risk of a congenital or hereditary genetic disorder
either prior to conception or during pregnancy. As a proximate
result of this negligently performed or omitted genetic counseling
or prenatal testing, the parents were foreclosed from making an
informed decision whether to conceive a potentially handicapped
child or, in the event of a pregnancy, to terminate the same.
Id. A separate issue is whether the harm alleged in the wrongful birth
context should be compensable. Compare Atlanta Obstetrics &
Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 560 (Ga. 1990) (“An analysis
of traditional tort law principles, even as applied in an age of ever
advancing medical technology, simply does not authorize a finding that a
physician, who has provided postconception prenatal care to an expectant
mother, should be held liable, even to a limited extent, for an impairment
which the child unquestionably inherited from her parents and an
impairment which was already in existence when the parents first came
into contact with the physician.”) with Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d
880, 883 (D.C. 1987) (“In a wrongful birth action such as the instant case,
a parent of an abnormal, unhealthy child claims that the physician’s
negligent advice or treatment deprived the parent of the right to decide
whether to avoid the birth of a child with congenital defects. The courts
that have been presented with this issue are virtually unanimous in
concluding that some measure of recovery should be permitted in wrongful
birth cases.”)
176. Keel, 624 So. 2d at 1029.
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It is accurate to suggest that the child would have been a different
person if different DNA had been used.177 But there are several reasons
that liability should not be precluded merely because the child would
have been a different person (with different DNA) but for the
negligence.178 The focus of the RhoGAM and rubella cases was not on
whether the negligence would cause harm to a child who had certain
DNA but, instead, on whether the negligence would foreseeably cause
harm to a child born to the woman who had become sensitized or who
had not been immunized.179 The same analysis might be used here. The
reason to require the sperm or eggs to be tested is precisely to prevent
this kind of foreseeable harm from occurring. Precluding liability
because but for the negligence the child who would be free of the
debilitating condition would in addition have had different DNA is to
immunize the negligent or even intentional mishandling of DNA.
Suppose that the child with the unscreened DNA who is living with
a devastating condition is precluded from suing because it would not
have been possible for a person with this DNA in particular to have
lived without that condition--in order not to have had this condition,
the individual would had to have been a different person (with different
DNA). An analogous argument might be used to preclude many suits—
there is no reason that DNA in particular should be privileged in this
way. There are other criteria that are essential to making the person
what she is, for example, an individual’s personality180 or her concept of
self.181 But if that is so and if the allegedly negligent conduct changed
those essential elements, then an individual caused to have severe
mental deficits would be precluded from suing—had the negligence not
occurred, the unharmed individual without the mental deficits would
have had a different personality and concept of self and thus would
have been someone else. Ex hypothesi, this individual was not harmed
177. See Fox, supra note 145, at 301(“(“For that child, ‘with his particular
biological composition, deriving from the unique pair of germ cells from
which he, and not another person, was conceived,’ the only alternative to
his having been exposed to the preconception conduct was never having
existed at all.”) (quoting Dov Fox, Luck, Genes, and Equality, 35 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 712, 713 (2007)).
178. See Cohen, supra note 65 at 1210–11 (“[I]f we want to know whether the
person that results from the particular sperm and egg combination would
be harmed, we cannot say that it would further the welfare of that person
if we instead substituted a different sperm and egg combination.”).
179. See supra notes 108–19 and accompanying text.
180. See Jennifer Nadler, Unconscionability, Freedom, and the Portrait of a
Lady, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 213, 229 (2015) (discussing “human
personality as an abstract, essential self”).
181. See Jane English, Abortion and the Concept of a Person, 5 CAN. J. PHIL.
233, 235 (1975) (discussing the theory that a “‘person’ is a cluster of
features, of which rationality, having a self-concept and being conceived
of humans are only part.”).
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because but for the negligence the individual would have been a
different person.
Such a policy would represent surprising priorities. There would be
no liability for negligence resulting in catastrophic loss, e.g., a severe
mental functioning impairment precluding the person from ever having
a sense of self or from functioning in the world,182 but there might well
be liability for something much less harmful, e.g., a fractured wrist.183
Further, victims as a general matter would be barred from suing
whenever the harm included a modification of their DNA or other
essential characteristics.184
Which characteristics would qualify as so essential to individual
personhood that their significant alteration would not be compensable
because resulting in a different person? That issue is precisely the sort
that one would expect courts to say is “more properly to be left to
the philosophers and the theologians.”185 Further, one would expect
that a state policy specifying that negligent action resulting in the loss
of essential attributes of personhood was not compensable would have
important implications for tort actions. If personality or self-concept
are essential elements of personhood, then a tortfeasor who negligently
obliterates a person’s personality or self-concept would in effect have
created a different person and would be immune from suit (at least with
respect to several causes of action).
Suppose that an individual, Alice, is in a terrible auto accident and
is now in a persistent vegetative state.186 Alice is now qualitatively
182. Cf. Merrill by Merrill v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 512 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520
(N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dept. 1987) (“The consequences were catastrophic,
causing plaintiff to suffer severe and diffuse brain damage with marked
difficulty with both intellectual and motor functions.”).
183. See Marcellus v. Nathan Littauer Hosp. Ass’n, 535 N.Y.S.2d 224, 224
(N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (upholding damages award of about $115,000 for
fractured wrist).
184. Cf. Chiropractic Ass’n of New York, Inc. v. Hilleboe, 228 N.Y.S.2d 358,
360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), aff’d, 187 N.E.2d 756 (N.Y. 1962). The court
explained:
It was found upon adequate evidence that when X rays of the full
spine are taken, the gonads or reproductive organs of the male or
female patient are in the direct primary beam and susceptible to
damage affecting the reproductive cells by producing deleterious
changes in the genes and chromosomes of those cells, leading to
mutations and resulting in serious abnormalities in the offspring
in future generations; that leukemia may also be a consequence of
X-ray exposure; and that the effects of a patient’s exposures are
additive and cumulative.
Id.
185. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
186. Cf. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266
(1990) (“She now lies in a Missouri state hospital in what is commonly
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different from what she had been like when thinking, feeling, and
experiencing the world. Alice’s family members might recover for loss
of consortium,187 but Alice, herself (now a different person), would not
be entitled to compensation because that “new” person had never not
been in a persistent vegetative state. Alice’s family might be able to
bring other causes of action as well. If one takes seriously that the
severely injured individual is now a different person because an essential
element of the (prior) individual’s personhood had been changed, then
wrongful death statutes might have to be reinterpreted—the prior
person would no longer be living so the tortfeasor might be thought
responsible for that individual’s death,188 even though there is now a
different
person
living
who
had
an
important
physical/genetic/historical connection to the previous individual. A
further surprising implication of such a position is that while the family
might be able to sue the tortfeasor for having caused the “prior” person
to cease to exist, the “new” individual in the permanent vegetative state
would be barred from recovery and thus the individual most in need of
the compensation would be barred from receiving it.
Some courts reasoned that wrongful birth actions should not be
recognized because the physician’s negligence did not cause the harm,189
even though the negligence (failure to communicate important
information in a timely way so that an abortion might be obtained or
conception avoided) might have caused a child with particular
referred to as a persistent vegetative state: generally, a condition in which
a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant
cognitive function.”). See also Ann MacLean Massie, Withdrawal of
Treatment for Minors in A Persistent Vegetative State: Parents Should
Decide, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 174 (1993) (discussing “the condition that
has come to be described as a ‘persistent vegetative state’ (PVS)—a
death-in-life, where vital organs may continue to function, but
consciousness has been irretrievably lost, and the brain has ceased to
function on all but the most primitive level”).
187. See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 994 (Alaska
1987) Precluding minor children from maintaining a cause of action for
loss of parental consortium arising from their parent’s injury would, in
our view, be inconsistent with the legislature’s authorization of such
recovery when the parent dies, and with our prior holding in Fruit that a
husband or wife may recover damages for loss of consortium when an
injured spouse survives.
188. See, e,g., MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2020). The statute states:
When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any
person or corporation, the trustee appointed as provided in
subdivision 3 may maintain an action therefor if the decedent
might have maintained an action, had the decedent lived, for an
injury caused by the wrongful act or omission.
Id.
189. See, e.g., Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 2004).
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disabilities to be brought into the world. In the ART cases, courts deny
the child compensation,190 notwithstanding that the negligence not only
causes the harm but brings about a child’s living in the world with an
onerous (and avoidable) condition. Such a policy choice is difficult to
justify.191

Conclusion
States differ about whether to recognize prenatal torts and about
the damages that are potentially recoverable for these causes of action.
Those differences may be due in part to the difficulties inherent in
comparing the preferability of never having lived to having lived with
a devastating condition or to a reluctance to impose liability on a
physician who failed to timely report but did not cause a serious
condition.
When minimizing the role played by the tortfeasor in prenatal torts,
courts often suggest that nature rather than the tortfeasor is responsible
for the harm to the child. In many ART cases, the choice is not nature
(genes) or the tortfeasor. Rather, because the negligence is in the choice
of genes to be used, the harm to the child may be attributable to nature
and the tortfeasor. Because of this important difference, the prenatal
tort jurisprudence is often the wrong model to use when analyzing ART
negligence.
In many torts, the law presumes that if the tortfeasor’s negligence
had not occurred, the victim allegedly harmed by that negligence would
have been the same in all relevant respects except for the claimed harm.
That way, the trier of fact can assess the damage. In ART cases where
the tortfeasor’s negligence results in the use of gametes causing the child
born to have a debilitating condition, the alternative (where the
negligence did not occur) is not simply the nonexistence of a child but
instead the existence of a child without the debilitating condition.
In many cases where donated gametes are used, the particular DNA
of the child is not relevant. Instead, what is relevant is that the child
should not be saddled with a devastating condition that the child born
would not have had but for the negligence.
The prenatal torts are not helpful to determine whether or how
much liability should be imposed precisely because the relevant
comparator (where the negligence had not occurred) is not childlessness
but a child to be loved. States permitting the victim to recover in these
kinds of cases would not be opening the door to suits merely because
190. See, e.g., B.F. v. Reprod. Med. Assocs. of New York, LLP (B.F. I), 136
A.D.3d 73, 76 (2015), aff’d, 30 N.Y.3d 608 (2017).
191. See Fox, supra note 145, at 301 (“[T]he government, with its broader
concern for the population-wide health of future citizens, should have a
legitimate interest that the cohort of children born into the next
generation suffer from fewer preventable diseases and disabilities.”).
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the child was not perfect but would instead be imposing liability on
individuals whose negligence results in eminently foreseeable, significant
harm.
The difference between prenatal torts and other kinds of prebirth
negligence might be especially important in states where prenatal torts
are barred insofar as the plaintiff claims to have been impeded in her
exercise of her abortion rights. While the exercise of abortion rights
based on accurate and timely information should be protected,
negligence in the ART context may implicate additional concerns
because the negligence causes a child to live a much worse life than
would otherwise have been lived. For the sake of these children and for
the sake of other victims whose rights to compensation might be
compromised by the specious rationales used to deny recovery in the
ART cases, states must act quickly to correct the mistakes that will
otherwise occur even more frequently as more and more people seek to
make use of ART to fulfill their procreative needs.
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